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The Court of Appeals of the State of New York in review-
ing the celebrated case of People v. Thorn, for the murder of
William Guldensuppe (5o N. E. Rep. 947), passed upon an
important question of law which heretofore has never been
fully considered or passed upon by that Court, and about which
the courts of the country are greatly in conflict. In the trial
below, the Court, under provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Sec. 411), allowed the jury, under proper instruction,
to visit and view the premises where the murder was com-
mitted. This was done in the absence of the accused, who by
his counsel waived the right 'of being present, and had
requested that the jury be allowed to view the premises without
his presence, or that of his counsel. On appeal it was contended
in behalf of the accused that this reviewing of the premises
was both a part of the trial and receiving evidence, and conse-
quently was such a proceeding at which one on trial for a cap-
ital offense could not waive the right of being present. The
argument being that the view by the jury could not be deemed
an idle ceremony; that it must be deemed to have been done
for a purpose, and taking place under order of the Court, was a
part of the trial (People v. Palmer, 44 Hun. 4oi; People v. Bush,
68 Cal. 623, xo Pac. 169).
On this point the Court of Appeals was divided, the major-
ity, however, holding that such a view of the premises was not
part of the trial, nor taking testimony within the Constitutional
Amendment, Art. 6, as incorporated in the bill of rights of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure, and was, therefore, a
proceeding at which the accused could waive being present-
"The provision in the bill of rights," ,quoting from the opinion,
" that the accused shallbe confronted with the witnesses against
him was designed to prevent secret trials in which the accused
was often arrested and executed without a hearing, aid with-
out any knowledge as to who were his accusers, or the evidence
upon which they relied. The provision had reference to the
persons who should testify against him. It is doubtless true,
as claimed, that jurors may draw inferences from the objects
which come under their vision. While mute, inanimate objects
may, in one sense, be witnesses, are they witnesses within the
contemplation of the Constitution and the Statute? We think
not. If seeing the locality is the taking of evidence in one
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case, it must be in another. If viewing the locality during the
trial is the taking of testimony, why is not the seeing of the
locality before the trial the taking of testimony? * * * It
appears, to us that the more rational and reasonable construc-
tion to be given to the provisions of the section is that the view
is not the taking of testimony within the meaning of the bill
of rights; but that the sole purpose and object of the view is
to enable the jurors to more accurately understand and more
fully appreciate the testimony of witnesses given before them.
The wise and beneficent object of the Statute should not be
lost sight of."
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. State of Missouri (i8
Sup. Ct. Rep. 922), affirms the decision of the Supreme Court of
that State in holding that a Statute authorizing the comparison
of disputed handwriting with any writing proved to be genuine
was not an ex-lostfacto law as applied to crimes previously com-
mitted, because "altering the legal rules of evidence" in
existence at the time the offense was committed. Thompson
was twice tried and convicted for the murder of the sexton of a
church by poisoning by strychnine. An important question in
the case was the authorship of a certain prescription for
strychnine, and also a letter addressed to the organist of the
church containing threatening language about the sexton. In
the first trial, letters of the defendant to his wife were admitted
and compared with these papers for the purpose of showing
defendant had written both. This the Supreme Court of the
State held to be error and reversed the decision of the trial
court and ordered a new trial. The Legislature of the State
then passed a law authorizing the "comparison of a disputed
writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge
to be genuine." Under this Statute, the defendant's letters to
his wife were again introduced in the new trial and he was
again convicted. This the defendant contended was illegal,
because the act of the Legislature as applied to him was an
ex-post facto law. The Supreme Court, however, held that it
failed to perceive any ground upon which the Statute could be
declared unconstitutional; that it did nothing more than permit
evidence of a particular kind to be admitted upon an issue
of fact in a criminal case, which, under the rules of evidence as
enforced by judicial decision at the commission of the crime,
was not admissible; that it did not enlarge the punishment, nor
make that criminal which was not criminal at the time the act
was done. Nor did it chane the quality or degree of the
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offense, nor in any way materially impair the right of the
accused to have the question of his guilt determined according
to the law as it was when the offense was committed, inasmuch
as it did not require "less proof, in amount or degree," but left
unimpaired the right of the jury to determine the sufficiency or
effect of the evidence declared admissible, and did not disturb
the rule that the statement overcame the presumption of
innocence and established the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The case of King v. Missouri, io6 U. S. 221, was cited
and distinguished.
One of the first decisions which has come to our attention in
which the War Revenue Act of 1898 has been discussed, is that
of Western Wheel Works v. The United States Ex press Co., decided
by Judge Tuley of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
The question in the case was whether the express company
should pay for the stamp or the shipper. This the Court held to
be the duty of the express company, and says that it is no less
a part of the express company's duty, under the Act, to affix
and cancel the stamp, than it is to issue a receipt to the shipper.
The Court's reasoning on this point is very clear. It says: "It
would be an absurd conclusion to say that the company is
required to issue to the shipper an unstamped bill of lading or
receipt, the issue of which is made a penal offense by section
seven of the Act. It was not the intent of the Statute to place
express companies under an obligation to do an illegal act. The
bill of lading or receipt which the express company is to issue
must be a complete bill of lading, a legal instrument, and this can
only be a stamped instrument." This, in our opinion, is as it
should be. The law in effect is that there shall be a tax paid on
each express package, that this shall be done by requiring a
stamp to, be placed on the express company's bill of lading or
receipt. It requires the express company to issue such a receipt
or bill of lading to the shipper and penalizes it if the stamp is
not thereto affixed and cancelled. From this it should logically
follow that it is the duty of the express company to affix and
cancel the stamp. To prevent the company from revising its rate
of transportation, and thus transfer to the public the burden of
the tax, Judge Tuley also held that a common carrier cannot
arbitrarily revise and increase its rate so as to impose the war
tax upon shippers, and thus relieve the carrier of the tax
imposed by law. In the present case, which was brought for a
mandamus compelling the express company to do its duty, the
Court in accordance with Nelson v. Chicago &, Alton Railroad Co.,
C. &- N. W. Ry. Co. v. Peo ple, 56 Ill. 365, and Vincent v. Chicago &
Alton., 49 Ill. 33, granted a continuing mandamus, holding that
to compel the shipper to seek a mandamus for each shipment
would be a mere travesty of justice, leaving the weak at the
mercy of the strong.
